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Inspired by [1, 2], modern general equilibria under uncertainty are modeled
based on the recognition that all risks cannot be eliminated, perfect hedging is not
possible, and some risk exposures must be tolerated. Therefore, we need to define
the set of acceptable risks [2] as a primitive of the financial economy. This set
will be a cone, hence the word conic. Such a conic perspective challenges classi-
cal economics by introducing finance into the economic models and enables us to
rewrite major chapters of classical micro- and macro-economics textbooks [3,4]. The
classical models dictate that economic players are able to trade the whole of their
endowments at what is known as a market-clearing price and direct all proceeds
to the consumption of goods and services. According to these models, the aggre-
gate consumption does not exceed the total endowment, suggesting that finance is
not a necessary component in the economy. This work proposes a case in which
some gap occurs between the aggregate supply and demand whereby the financial
primitives cover the aforementioned gap. This also generates a bid-ask spread at
equilibrium depending on the cone of acceptable risks [2]. This work questions the
traditional law of one price and poses a direct challenge to Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand” theory. Since the housing crisis in 2008, economists and statisticians have
questioned the law of one price (see e.g., [5]). The implications of this academic
debate are sweeping and affect players at all levels of the economy. Though we
spend little time on empirical applications, the perceived empirical failures of the
standard complete markets general equilibrium model stimulated the development
of this work. For example, the standard complete markets model has the following
empirical problems: (1) there is too much correlation between individual income
and consumption growth in micro data (see e.g., [6, 7]); (2) the equity premium
is larger in the data than is implied by a representative agent asset-pricing model
with reasonable risk-aversion parameter (see e.g., [8]); and (3) the risk-free interest
rate is too low relative to the observed aggregate rate of consumption growth (see
e.g., [9]). There have been numerous attempts to explain these puzzles by altering
the preferences in the standard complete markets model (see e.g., [10]). Alterna-
tively, one might as well abandon the complete markets assumption and replace it
with some versions of either exogenously [11] or endogenously [12] incomplete mar-
kets. However, this work takes a totally different approach in the sense that the
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The classical thinking is that all the financial system does is to operate as an
intermediary, bringing borrowers and lenders together, but the size of the economy
is not affected by the financial system. In a classical complete markets model, as a
direct consequence of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the financial
system is irrelevant to the actual economy. In fact, if all one wants to prove is that a
free market system can deliver what a central planner can mathematically achieve,
then one should operate under the rules of the central planner. Endowments, pref-
erences, and the technology is the economy, and finance has to be irrelevant. Of
course, what we show in this work is that the financial market configurations have
real welfare effects and that a free market system can do better than a central plan-
ner because a conic economy is ready to take extra risk. Now, of course, you could
get into the troublesome situation of being at a very high aggregate welfare level,
like in 2007 when the financial system was so forgiving that 2008 came and knocked
the whole system out. This happened because the financial market was simply
too forgiving in 2007. A conic perspective towards the economy enables us to ask
some very serious questions; How forgiving should the financial system be? In other
words, how much risk taking should be permitted? Who or what determines the
financial market configurations? In other words, is there a way to write an endoge-
nous model of the financial market? What role can the government play in managing
the financial market and therefore the size of the economy? Simply because of the
implicit assumption of the irrelevance of the financial market to the actual economy,
these fundamental questions have been totally ignored and are still open, yet to be
ii
answered. In fact, these are questions of managing the capital requirements and
leverage of an economy and should be addressed by the Federal Reserve. Basically,
in a free market environment, we say that we don’t want humans, governments, or
committees to make the decisions. All decisions should be made in the market, but
the market has its own incentives. Perhaps an example from the airline industry
can help clarify these incentives. The point is that the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) decides the weight of a plane that can take off. United Airlines does
not make a decision about the weight of its aircraft at take off. The rules for that
should be set by the FAA, because airlines have an incentive to allow more weights.
However, there is a science behind how much weight a plane can tolerate, and the
FAA relies on that science. Similarly, for the economy in general and the Federal
Reserve in particular to manage leverage and determine how much capital backing
it needs for risky positions, we need to have a science of leverage. However, we can
not have a science of leverage, if we assume that we live in complete markets and
there is no risk. Because then we don’t need capital and so we will never figure
out leverage policy listening to classical economics since it has already assumed it
away. Fortunately, the Basel Committee are making recommendations on capital
requirements but this is all done outside of professional economics.
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Chapter 1: Conic general equilibrium
Building upon [1, 13] and based on the recognition that all risks cannot be
eliminated, we take a novel perspective towards modeling general equilibrium under
uncertainty. General equilibrium under uncertainty (see [3], chapter 19) lies at the
foundation of a very rich body of literature in economics and finance theory (see
e.g., [14–17]). Our modeling approach relies on defining the set of acceptable risks [2]
(see definition 1.1) as a primitive of the financial market. Such a set will be a cone
(see figures 1.1 and 1.2), and that is why we use the word conic.
1.1 Conic financial market
Let us start by assuming that an exhaustive set S of states of the world is
given to us. For simplicity, we take S to be a finite set. A typical element is denoted
by s ∈ S. We suppose that there are two dates, t = 0 and t = 1, that there is no
information whatsoever at t = 0, and that the uncertainty has resolved completely
at t = 1. The probability of observing a particular event s is denoted by π(s). The
probability distribution π is therefore given by π = {π(s) : s ∈ S}. The financial
market is characterized by two setsM andN of probability measures or “generalized
scenarios” [1, 2] identifying the “acceptable” amount of individual and aggregate
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risks, respectively. Essentially, a risk is a random variable and is acceptable to
the market if it has a positive valuation under all generalized scenarios. The more
scenarios considered, the more conservative (ambiguity1 or uncertainty averse [26])
is the financial market. We denote a typical scenario by π̂ = {π̂(s) : s ∈ S}. We
assume π ∈ M ⊂ N which indicates that the physical measure π is one of the
scenarios considered by the financial market and that the financial market is more
strict towards aggregate risk. Using the setsM and N of generalized scenarios, we
can define the notion of acceptable risks2 .
Definition 1.1 (acceptable risks). Given a state price vector q = {q(s) : s ∈ S},
the set of acceptable individual AM (or aggregate AN ) risks z = {z(s) : s ∈ S} to
the financial market is defined by







q(s)z(s) ≥ 0, ∀π̂ ∈M (or N )
}
.
In other words, an individual or aggregate risk z = {z(s) : s ∈ S} is acceptable to






under all generalized scenarios considered by the market at the individual or aggre-
gate level, respectively. As we proceed throughout this work, it is always a good
1There seems to be a close link between this work and the existing literature on general equi-
librium under ambiguity (see e.g., [18–25]) where the consumers’ beliefs are altered to reflect
uncertainty aversion. In contrast, this work adopts standard preferences for the households and
models the financial market as an ambiguity averse entity.
2For an axiomatic treatment of the notion of acceptable risks, the reader is strongly encouraged
to refer to the paper by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath [2] on coherent measures of risk.
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exercise to keep in mind the extreme cases of M = {π} being a singleton and
N = {π̂ :
∑
s∈S π̂(s) = 1} being the set of all probability measures. In particular, if
M = {π} is a singleton, a risk z is acceptable to the market at the individual level




Similarly, ifN = {π̂ :
∑
s∈S π̂(s) = 1} is the set of all probability measures, then only
random outcomes that have positive values in all states of the world are acceptable
to the market at the aggregate level; i.e.,
z(s) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S.
This is because the test measures {(1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 1, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, 0, . . . , 1)} are
all included in N . Furthermore, the notion of acceptable risks defined above (see
definition 1.1) leads naturally to the definition of ask and bid prices. Basically,
the price at which one can trade depends on the direction of the trade and there
are typically different quotes at which one may sell or buy. The best price (bid)
at which one may sell a random outcome z of cash flows is then the infimum or
minimal valuation of the cash flow being priced under all generalized scenarios.
Similarly the best price (ask) at which one may buy a random outcome of cash
flows is the supremum or maximal valuation under all scenarios.
Definition 1.2 (ask and bid prices). Given a state price vector q, the ask and bid
prices of a random payoff z are defined as

















From the observation of equality between buying a random cash-flow z and selling
its negative −z, one can simply deduce that ask(z;M, q) = − bid(−z;M, q). By
virtue of the infimum, the bid price is a concave function on the space of random
outcomes and is suited to being maximized. The ask price on the other hand is a
convex function of the random outcomes, suited to being minimized. Moreover, it
is worth noting that if M = {π} is a singleton, then




and we recover the classical law of one price. Having configured our financial market
structure, in the following, we will introduce the conic equilibrium concept for a pure
exchange economy with a single commodity.
1.2 Pure exchange economy – single commodity
Let us start with an exchange economy composed of I > 0 consumers and
one commodity. Each consumer i = 1, . . . , I is characterized by a vector of initial
endowments yi = {yi(s) : s ∈ S} and a utility function U(·) over consumption plans






Notice that we are imposing identical preference orderings across all individuals i
that can be represented in terms of expected utility with common utility function
u(·) and common probability distribution π. In the following, we will present a
formal definition of the conic equilibrium concept. Later, we will elaborate on key
features and consequences of such a modeling approach using concrete examples.










a collection formed by
• a state price vector q = {q(s) : s ∈ S} and,
• for every consumer i = 1, . . . , I, trading plan zi∗ = {zi∗(s) : s ∈ S} at t = 0
and consumption plan ci∗ := {ci∗(s) : s ∈ S} at t = 1,
constitutes a conic equilibrium if:
• given the state price vector q and the financial market configuration M at the
individual level, for every consumer i = 1, . . . , I, the trading zi∗ and consump-











q(s)zi(s) ≤ 0, ∀π̂ ∈M, (1.1)
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• and, given the financial market configuration N at the aggregate level, the state








zi∗(s) ≤ 0, ∀π̂ ∈ N . (1.2)
The budget constraint (1.1) can be equivalently expressed as ask(zi;M, q) ≤ 0, or
−zi ∈ AM. The latter means that −zi should be acceptable to the market at the





zi∗ ∈ AN ,




∗ should be acceptable to the




s∈S π̂(s) = 1
}
,
the conic equilibrium concept defined above simplifies to the traditional Radner equi-




while the market clearing condition matches the classical one; i.e.,
∑
i
zi∗(s) ≤ 0, ∀s ∈ S.
This particular setup is exactly what is known as the complete markets model. The
market clearing condition in a traditional complete markets model can be equiva-





yi(s), ∀s ∈ S.
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This indicates positive excess supply meaning that the aggregate endowment should
exceed the aggregate consumption of the economy in all states of the world. This
suggests that finance is not a necessary component of the economy. In fact, if
we live in an economy in which no matter what happens the supply should always
exceed demand, the economy has to close down and there should be no transactions.
Basically, one can not actually ever conceive of any economy capable of guaranteeing
positive excess supply in every state of the world. One major contribution of this
work is its ability to relax the classical positive excess supply requirement by allowing
N to be a proper subset of the set of all probability measures. In particular, the
market clearing condition (1.2) allows the aggregate economy to consume more
than its endowment in some states of the world. Moreover, it is also instructive




s∈S π̂(s) = 1
}
. At this other extreme, no
risk is tolerated by the financial market at the individual level, and households are
left to consume their endowments; i.e., ci(s) ≤ yi(s), for all s ∈ S. Thus, our
conic perspective towards general equilibrium under uncertainty provides us with a
unifying framework to model a whole spectrum between incomplete and complete,
illiquid and perfectly liquid markets, and beyond. In the following, we will elaborate
more on the conic equilibrium concept using a common tool in general equilibrium
analysis, namely, the Edgeworth box (see [3], chapter 15). This allows us to study
the interaction of two individuals trading one commodity under uncertainty.
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1.2.1 Conic Edgeworth box
Consider an economy in which there are two states of the world S = {s1, s2}
and two consumers with endowments y1 = {y1(s1), y1(s2)} and y2 = {y2(s1), y2(s2)}.
Let (π, 1−π) denote the physical probability measure, where π is the probability of
being in state s1. Thus, the financial market can be characterized by two intervals
M = [mL,mR] and N = [nL, nR] of generalized scenarios π̂. Given the state price
vector3 (q, 1− q), consumer i = 1, 2 solves
max
ci(s1),ci(s2),zi(s1),zi(s2)
U(ci) = πu[ci(s1)] + (1− π)u[ci(s2)]






(1− q)zi(s2) ≤ 0, (1.3)
∀π̂ ∈M = [mL,mR] ⊆ [0, 1].
Here, mL ≤ π ≤ mR. Since the budget constraint (1.3) is a linear function of π̂, its
maximum is achieved at either mL or mR boundary of the interval M. Therefore,












(1− q)zi(s2) ≤ 0.
Moreover, the corresponding set of acceptable individual risks AM to the financial
market is therefore a cone and is depicted in figure 1.1. Note that if mL = mR = π,
3It should be noted that the state prices are determined upto a constant in equilibrium. There-
fore, we seek a state price vector of the form (q, 1− q).
8
these two constraints merge into the classical one; i.e.,
qzi(s1) + (1− q)zi(s2) ≤ 0,
which corresponds to the usual budget constraint in the Radner equilibrium (see [3],
chapter 19). Figure 1.2 depicts the corresponding cone (half space) of acceptable
individual risks for the case of the Radner equilibrium. The first order conditions
































i(s) + zi∗(s), ∀s ∈ {s1, s2}.
Here, µiL and µ
i
R are the Lagrange multipliers on the household’s budget constraints.

















which for the Radner equilibrium, i.e., mL = mR = π, simplifies to the classical


































Figure 1.2: Cones of acceptable individual AM and aggregate AN risks


















(1− q)[z1∗(s2) + z2∗(s2)] ≤ 0.
Therefore, the corresponding set of acceptable aggregate risks AN to the financial
market is a cone and can be depicted as in figure 1.1. Here, M ⊆ N , i.e., nL ≤




∗(s) ≤ 0, ∀s ∈ {s1, s2},
which is exactly the market clearing condition in the Radner equilibrium. Figure
1.2 depicts the corresponding cone of acceptable aggregate risks for the Radner
equilibrium. Our equilibrium concept can be best illustrated by means of the conic
Edgeworth box depicted in figure 1.3. The budget sets of the two consumers along
with the aggregate cone offered by the financial market are depicted in distinct
colors. Moreover, black filled circles denote optimal consumption allocations for
the two consumers and the aggregate economy. The conic Edgeworth box reminds
us of the metaphor “thinking out of the box” which means to think differently,
unconventionally, or from a new perspective. In particular, in a conic economy, the
aggregate consumption is allowed to go beyond the box defined by the aggregate
endowments in some states of the world, whereby the financial primitives cover the
resulting gap. Hence, the conic economy is a bigger economy because it is willing to



























Figure 1.3: Conic Edgeworth box.
world but if it does, it is just like the Federal Reserve stepping in and covering the
loss. The following numerical example adds more detail concerning what has been
discussed so far.
1.2.2 Numerical example
Let π = 0.5, u(c) = log(c), and assume that y1 = (3, 1) and y2 = (1, 2) are
the endowments of the two consumers. First, consider the classical case with mL =
mR = π, nL = 0, and nR = 1. This case corresponds to the Radner equilibrium
and is presented here for comparison reasons. The market clearing conditions yield
12












1 2.16667 1.625 -0.833333 0.625 0.538462 0
2 1.83333 1.375 0.833333 -0.625 0 0.636364
Aggregate 4 3 0 0
a state price q = 3/7 ≈ 0.428571, and the corresponding trading and consumption
plans are given in table 1.1. Next, let us consider the case with mL = 0.4, mR = 0.6,
nL = 0.2, and nR = 0.8. In this case, relative to the classical economy, the market is
less forgiving at the indivual level but more forgiving at the aggregate level. Solving
the market clearing conditions for the state price gives q = 0.478261. Furthermore,
we obtain the consumption and trading plans given in table 1.2. It is worth noting
that z1∗(s1) + z
2




∗(s2) > 0 which means that the financial
market is compensating for the shortcomings in the second state of the world. In
contrast to the classical model (see table 1.1), where the aggregate consumption
does not exceed the total endowment, as both table 1.2 and figure 1.3 illustrate,
some gap is permitted to occur between the aggregate consumption and endowment
in a conic environment. In the following, we will examine the welfare consequences
of adopting a conic perspective towards general equilibrium under uncertainty.
1.2.3 Welfare analysis
Using the same setup as in the numerical example of section 1.2.2, the utility
values resulting from different financial configurations are presented in table 1.3.
13












1 2.31818 1.41667 -0.681818 0.416667 0.563725 0
2 1.22727 1.6875 0.227273 -0.3125 0 0.709877
Aggregate 3.54545 3.10417 -0.454545 0.104167
From the first five rows of this table, one can infer that as the financial market
becomes more strict towards aggregate risk, the overall welfare along with the utility
of the richer consumer (i.e., consumer 1) decreases while the utility of the poorer
consumer (i.e., consumer 2) increases. Moreover, the next five rows of this table
show that as the financial market becomes less tolerant of individual risks, the
overall welfare along with the utility of both consumers decreases. The highest total
welfare corresponds to the case with nL = mL = π = mR = nR = 0.5. For this
financial configuration, consumer 1 has the highest welfare possible and consumer 2
has the lowest. The last row of table 1.3 showcases a financial market configuration
with a higher total welfare than that of a Radner equilibrium, without being as
forgiving as the Radner equilibrium at the individual level. The overall message is
that the financial market configurations have real effect on individual and aggregate
welfare (happiness) of the economy and it can justify government intervention and
regulation of markets in certain economic situations. The following utility analysis
exercise will help us elaborate more on this message.
Specifically, let us fix the financial market configurations mL,mR, nL, nR and
perform the following exercise. Given this configuration, we solve our example
14
Table 1.3: Welfare analysis for different financial configurations.









0.40 0.60 0.4 0.6 0.665027 0.346574 1.0116
0.40 0.60 0.3 0.7 0.608198 0.356883 0.965081
0.40 0.60 0.2 0.8 0.594545 0.364021 0.958566
0.40 0.60 0.1 0.9 0.588543 0.368143 0.956686
0.40 0.60 0.0 1.0 0.58519 0.37078 0.955969
0.50 0.50 0.0 1.0 0.629349 0.462295 1.091644
0.45 0.55 0.0 1.0 0.608427 0.405924 1.01435
0.40 0.60 0.0 1.0 0.58519 0.37078 0.955969
0.35 0.65 0.0 1.0 0.563129 0.352632 0.915761
0.30 0.70 0.0 1.0 0.549814 0.346713 0.896527
0.50 0.50 0.5 0.5 0.906189 0.346574 1.25276










Figure 1.4: Box defined by equilibrium allocations.
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problem (see section 1.2.2) for equilibrium allocations and prices. The equilib-






∗(s2)) will give us a new box given by








∗(s2)) as depicted in figure 1.4. Given the
box (y(s1), y(s2)), we redistribute initial endowments (y(s1), y(s2)) = (4, 3) among
agents in such a way that the resulting equilibrium allocations gives us the same box
(y(s1), y(s2)). We then compute the utility values of such allocations and plot the
resulting utility frontier. This procedure is detailed in the following. We first solve







(1− q)[y(s2)− y(s2)] = 0.
Choose (c1(s1), c
1(s2)) in the box given by (y(s1), y(s2)). Let
(c2(s1), c
2(s2)) = (y(s1), y(s2))− (c1(s1), c1(s2))




















Now, fix (nL, nR) = (0, 1) and change (mL,mR) from (0.5, 0.5) to (0.4, 0.6) in order
to obtain the utility frontiers given in figure 1.5. This figure indicates that as the
market becomes more strict towards individual risks, the utility frontier retracts.
16
Figure 1.5: Utility frontier retracts as the market becomes more strict
towards individual risks. This figure and the next one are obtained by
plotting actual numerical utility values for different endowment redistri-
butions resulted from a Monte-Carlo sampling procedure.
Figure 1.6: Utility frontier retracts as the market becomes more strict
towards aggregate risks.
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Moreover, fixing (mL,mR) = (0.5, 0.5) and changing (nL, nR) from (0, 1) to (0.5, 0.5)
yields the utility frontiers given in figure 1.6. This figure also indicates that as the
market becomes less tolerant of aggregate risks, the utility frontier retracts. Figures
1.5 and 1.6, reinforce the previous message that the financial market configurations
have real welfare effects in a conic economy.
1.3 Equilibrium prices and quantities
Let us go back to the more general structure of a conic equilibrium specified













This is a plausible assumption and indicates that the supremum is attainable. Thus,






Attach a Lagrange multiplier µi to this constraint, form the Lagrangian, and use the



















for all pairs (i, j). Note that if M = {π} is a singleton, then
π̂(s; zi) = π̂(s; zj) = π(s),
18
and consequently the ratios of marginal utilities between pairs of agents are constant







However, in general, this no longer holds (see equation (1.5)) in a conic economy
with an arbitrary financial market configuration M. Similarly, assuming that for
















meaning that the supremum is attainable, the market clearing condition (1.2) can





Using the first order condition (1.4) for any household i, we obtain the following












To compute an equilibrium, we propose the following algorithm4 which generalizes
the Negishi algorithm (see [4], chapter 8).
1. Fix µ1 = 1, throughout the algorithm, and guess some positive initial values
for the remaining µi, i = 2, . . . , I.
4The non-linearities involved in the definition of a conic general equilibrium makes a convergence
proof of the proposed algorithm non-trivial. A convergence proof would require imposing further
restrictions on the sets M and N identifying the financial market configurations. This will be
subject of future research.
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2. Make initial guesses for π̂(zi), i = 1, . . . , I, and π̂(Z). A good initial guess is
usually given by the actual physical measure π.
3. Solve the following system of equations, using the Levenberg-Marquardt [28,
29] method for instance, for candidate consumption {ci}Ii=1 and trading {zi}Ii=1
allocations;





















































Moreover, corresponding to the market clearing condition, check the validity













Update π̂(zi), for i = 1, . . . , I, and π̂(Z) accordingly. It is worth noting that
this step boils down to maximizing linear objective functions.
6. Iterate on steps 3-5 until the requirements of step 5 are satisfied.
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Increase µi for those i’s that violate this constraint and decrease it for others.
8. Iterate to convergence on steps 2-7.
Applying the algorithm outlined above to the numerical settings of section 1.2.2, we
obtain µ2 = 1.2593, q(s1) = 0.2696, and q(s2) = 0.2941. The resulting equilibrium




which matches the value q of the state price vector (q, 1−q) from the aforementioned
section. In the following, we will demonstrate that the conic equilibrium concept
is inevitably immune to some of the most empirically criticized conclusions of a
complete markets model.
CRRA utility
In particular, suppose that the one-period utility function is of the constant




, γ > 0.



















and states that the consumption allocations for two distinct agents are constant























s∈S π̂(s) = 1
}
, it says that individual consumption is













This implies that the consumption cj(s) is independent of the household’s individual
endowment yj(s) in state s. However, all of these nice and oversimplified conclusions
will evaporate as soon as we allow M to be more general than a singleton (see
equation (1.6)), or if we let N to be a proper subset of the set of all probability
measures.
1.4 Asset markets
The contingent commodities zi = {zi(s) : s ∈ S} considered in the previous
sections serve the purpose of transferring wealth across states of the world. They are,
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however, only theoretical constructs that rarely have exact counterparts in reality.
Nevertheless, in reality there are securities, or assets, that to some extent perform
the wealth-transferring role assigned to zi. It is therefore important to study the
functioning of these asset markets. We begin by letting rs = {rs(s′) : s′ ∈ S} denote
an Arrow-Debreu security with returns rs(s) = 1 and rs(s
′) = 0 if s′ 6= s. Moreover,
let zi(s) be the quantities demanded by consumer i for security rs. The ask and bid
prices (see definition 1.2) of an arbitrary Arrow-Debreu security with return vector
rs are given by









respectively. Note that if M = {π} is a singleton, then
ask(rs;M, q) = bid(rs;M, q) = q(s).
Furthermore, if household i takes a position zi = {zi(s) : s ∈ S} in these securities,

















= −zi(s) ask (−rs;M, q) = zi(s) bid(rs;M, q).
In other words, a negative position, i.e., zi(s) < 0, means that household i is selling
security rs at the bid price, while a positive position, i.e., z
i(s) > 0, means that it



















r2 = (0, 1)
zi(s2)


















q(s)zi(s) ≤ 0, ∀π̂ ∈M,
can be reinterpreted as a liquidity constraint and it limits the quantity of these
Arrow-Debreu securities that can be demanded. In other words, the market for
these securities is not perfectly liquid. When S = {s1, s2}, this interpretation can
be illustrated using figure 1.7. It is worth mentioning that instead of Arrow-Debreu,
we could use any other securities. For instance, when S = {s1, s2}, we could employ
securities with return vectors (1, 0) and (1, 1).
1.5 Pure exchange economy – multiple commodities
It is straightforward, but necessary, to extend the single commodity framework
developed so far to multiple commodities. Let us begin by assuming that there are
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L commodities in the economy and that at t = 0 consumers have expectations
regarding the spot prices prevailing at t = 1 for each of the L commodities. It
is important to emphasize that the correct anticipation of future spot prices is a
crucial assumption and is common practice in the literature (see [3], chapter 19).
Let the endowment of consumer i = 1, . . . , I be a contingent commodity vector
yi = {yi(s) = (yi1(s), . . . , yiL(s)) : s ∈ S}.
This means that if state s occurs then consumer i has endowment vector yi(s) =
(yi1(s), . . . , y
i
L(s)).










a collection formed by
• a state price vector q = {q(s) : s ∈ S},
• a spot price vector p(s) = (p1(s), . . . , pL(s)), for every s ∈ S, and,
• for every consumer i, trading plan zi∗ = {zi∗(s) : s ∈ S} at t = 0 and consump-
tion plan ci∗ := {ci∗(s) = (ci∗1(s), . . . , ci∗L(s)) : s ∈ S} at t = 1,
constitutes a conic equilibrium if:
• given the state price vector q, the spot price vector p(s), for every s ∈ S,
and the financial market configuration M at the individual level, for every
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consumer i = 1, . . . , I, the trading zi∗ and consumption c
i












q(s)zi(s) ≤ 0, ∀π̂ ∈M,
• and, given the financial market configuration N at the aggregate level, the state
price vector q and the spot price vector p(s), for every s ∈ S, are chosen such

















zi∗(s), 0, . . . , 0
)
, ∀s ∈ S.




s∈S π̂(s) = 1
}
,
the conic equilibrium concept defined above simplifies to the Radner equilibrium
(see [3], chapter 19). Furthermore, the market clearing conditions, the way we have
defined them, indicate that only in one of the commodities (the numeraire, i.e., good
1) the economy is permitted to consume beyond its aggregate endowment. This is
a simplifying assumption and in reality we don’t have to have the markets for other
commodities to be non-conic. However, it makes the notation more convenient and
the analysis simpler to assume that only the markets for cash (good 1) are conic.
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Numerical example
Consider an economy with two commodities in which there are two states of
the world S = {s1, s2} and two consumers with endowments
y1 = {y1(s1),y1(s2)} = (y11(s1), y12(s1), y11(s2), y12(s2)) = (3, 1, 1, 1),
y2 = {y2(s1),y2(s2)} = (y21(s1), y22(s1), y21(s2), y22(s2)) = (1, 1, 2, 1).
Given the state price vector (q, 1− q), consumer i = 1, 2 solves
max
ci,zi
U(ci) = πu[ci1(s1), c
i
2(s1)] + (1− π)u[ci1(s2), ci2(s2)]
s.t. ci1(s) + p(s)c
i












(1− q)zi(s2) ≤ 0.
















(1− q)[z1∗(s2) + z2∗(s2)] ≤ 0,
c1∗2(s) + c
2
∗2(s) ≤ y12(s) + y22(s). ∀s ∈ {s1, s2}.
Assume π = 0.5, U(ci) = π log [(ci1(s1))
α(ci2(s1))
1−α]+(1−π) log [(ci1(s2))α(ci2(s2))1−α],
and α = 0.5. Let us first consider the case where mL = mR = π and nL = 0, nR = 1.
In this case, we obtain q = 3/7, p(s1) = 2, and p(s2) = 1.5. Table 1.4 gives
the consumption plans for both consumers. Let us now consider the case where
mL = 0.4,mR = 0.6, nL = 0.2, and nR = 0.8. In this case, we obtain q = 0.436104,
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1 2.08333 1.04167 1.5625 1.04167 -0.833333 0.625 0.28 0
2 1.91667 0.958333 1.4375 0.958333 0.833333 -0.625 0 0.304348
Aggregate 4 2 3 2 0 0
















1 2.45902 1.24224 1.26783 0.842993 -0.0614754 0.0316957 0.291406 0
2 1.5 0.757764 1.7401 1.15701 0.0204918 -0.0237718 0 0.318477
Aggregate 3.95902 2 3.00792 2 -0.0409836 0.00792393
p(s1) = 1.97951, and p(s2) = 1.50396. The consumption plans are given in table
1.5. It is worth noting that z1∗(s1) + z
2




∗(s2) > 0 which means
that the financial market is compensating for the shortcomings in the second state
of the world.
1.6 Firm behavior
In previous sections, we have focused on the study of exchange economies. For
once, this has not been just for simplicity. In fact, the consideration of production
and firms is genuinely more difficult (see [30, 31]). As before, we consider a setting
with two periods, t = 0 and t = 1, and S possible states at t = 1. There are
L physical commodities traded in the spot markets of period t = 1. There is no
consumption at t = 0. We introduce into our model a firm that produces a random
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amount of the numeraire (good 1) at date t = 1. The firm produces perhaps by
means of inputs used at time t = 0, but we do not formalize this part explicitly.
Let d = {d(s) : s ∈ S} denote the state contingent levels of production of the firm.
The shares αi ≥ 0, with
∑
i α
i = 1, give the proportion of the firm that belongs to
consumer i. We take the natural point of view (see [3], chapter 19) that the firm
is an asset with return vector d = {d(s) : s ∈ S} whose shares are tradeable in
the financial market at time t = 0. Suppose that the firm can actually choose its
random production plan within a range D of possible choices of return vectors. We
assume that the return vector is chosen before the opening of financial markets at
time t = 0. Moreover, we assume that we are dealing with a small project relative
to the size of the economy. This would justify that the equilibrium spot prices p(s)
and state prices q = {q(s) : s ∈ S} are constants independent of the particular
production plan chosen by the firm. For the state prices q = {q(s) : s ∈ S}, the
market value of any production plan d = {d(s) : s ∈ S} should naturally be given
by







Taking the bid price as the market value of a production plan is well-justified because
the firm resides on the supply side of the economy for assets. In fact, the firm should
be sold at the bid price. By virtue of the infimum, the bid price is a concave and
typically nonlinear function on the space of random outcomes and is suited to being
maximized. On the demand side of the economy for assets, reside the households.









s.t. p(s) · ci(s) ≤ p(s) · yi(s) + p1(s)zi(s), ∀s ∈ S,
ask(zi;M, q) ≤ αi bid(d;M, q). (1.7)
It follows from the form of the budget constraint (1.7) that the objective of market
value bid(d;M, q) maximization will be the unanimous desire of the firm’s initial



















zi(s)− d(s), 0, . . . , 0
)
, ∀s ∈ S.









yi(s), ∀s ∈ S.
The one-consumer, one-producer economy
Consider again an economy in which there are two states of the world S =
{s1, s2} and one commodity. The economy consists of one consumer with endowment
y = (y(s1), y(s2)) = (3, 1) and a firm. Let us assume that the firm chooses its
production plan d = (d(s1), d(s2)) from the set
D = {d : d(s1) ≥ 0, d(s2) ≥ 0, d(s1)2 + d(s2)2 ≤ 1}.
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Given the state price vector (q, 1 − q), the firm maximizes its bid value subject to




s.t. d ∈ D.














Since the consumer is the owner of the firm and has less endowment in the second



















Moreover, given the state price vector (q, 1 − q) and the firm’s market value of
bid(d∗;M, q), the household solves
max
c(s1),c(s2),z(s1),z(s2)
πu[c(s1)] + (1− π)u[c(s2)]












(1− q)z(s2) ≤ bid(d∗;M, q).
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Table 1.6: Classical equilibrium – production economy.
c∗(s1) c∗(s2) z∗(s1) z∗(s2) µL µR d∗(s1) d∗(s2)
3.47569 1.87961 0.475687 0.879615 0.409868 0 0.475687 0.879615
Table 1.7: Conic equilibrium – production economy.
c∗(s1) c∗(s2) z∗(s1) z∗(s2) µL µR d∗(s1) d∗(s2)
3.56475 1.71 0.564754 0.710002 0.418992 0 0.733547 0.679639
Let π = 0.5 and u(c) = log(c). If mL = mR = π, nL = 0, and nR = 1, we get the






(1− q)[z(s2)− d(s2)] ≤ 0, ∀π̂ ∈ N = [nL, nR],
gives q = 0.350982. Moreover, we obtain the consumption and production plans
given in table 1.6. Note that z∗ − d∗ = 0, indicating positive excess supply in both
states of the world. The utility value resulting from this financial configuration is
given by 0.938429. Furthermore, if mL = 0.4,mR = 0.6, nL = 0.2, and nR = 0.8,
we get q = 0.418451 and the consumption and production plans given in table
1.7. It should be noted that z∗ − d∗ = (−0.168793, 0.0303636) which means that
the financial market is compensating for the shortcomings in the second state of the




In summary, we have presented a modern perspective towards modeling gen-
eral equilibrium under uncertainty. We have relied upon the definition of acceptable
risks in order to generalize the classical complete markets model. Essentially, a risk
is acceptable to the market, if it has a positive valuation under all scenarios consid-
ered by the financial system. Our modeling framework leads naturally to a two-price
(conic) economy and relaxes the traditional positive excess supply assumption. In
fact, in a conic environment, the aggregate economy is permitted to consume more
than its endowment in some states of the world. Therefore, a conic economy is a
bigger economy, relative to the classical models, because it is willing to tolerate more
risk at the aggregate level. Our conic perspective towards modeling general equi-
librium under uncertainty provides us with a unifying framework to model a whole
spectrum between incomplete and complete, illiquid and perfectly liquid markets,
and beyond. Moreover, we have managed to generalize a common tool in general
equilibrium analysis, namely, the Edgeworth box. We have also preformed some
welfare analysis exercises to draw the conclusion that the financial market config-
urations have real effect on individual and aggregate welfare of the economy. This
can justify government intervention and regulation of markets in certain economic
situations. Our conic perspective towards the economy enables us to ask some very
serious questions; How forgiving should the financial system be? Put differently,
how much risk taking should be permitted? Who or what determines the finan-
cial market configurations M and N ? In other words, is there a way to write an
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endogenous model of the financial market? What role can the government play in
managing M and N , and therefore the size of the economy? These are questions
of managing the capital requirements and leverage of an economy and should be
addressed by the Federal Reserve. These fundamental questions have been totally
ignored because of the complete markets assumptions and as a consequence of the
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. We have therefore demonstrated the
importance of developing a science of leverage. Furthermore, we have briefly men-
tioned that a conic equilibrium model is inevitably immune to some of the most
empirically criticized conclusions of a complete markets model. We have also ad-
dressed, from a conic perspective, the more difficult problem of modeling the firm’s
behavior in a general equilibrium under uncertainty. Throughout this chapter we
have tried to maintain a normative rather than positive outlook. In particular, we
have spent very little time addressing question of the form: Does an equilibrium
exist? Are the equilibria typically isolated? Is the equilibrium unique? Is it stable?
What are the effects of shocks? These are very important theoretical and method-
ological questions that are of relevance to any theory of equilibrium. Hence, these
questions must be subject of future research, should the conic perspective towards
the economy prove useful from a normative point of view.
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Chapter 2: Dynamic conic general equilibrium
This chapter introduces dynamic conic equilibria for an infinite horizon pure
exchange economy with stochastic endowments (see [4], chapter 8). These are useful
for studying consumption, risk sharing, and asset pricing (see chapter 4). We con-
sider two types of financial markets entailing different assets and timings of trades:
a time 0 trading arrangement, and a sequential-trading structure. We will explain
how to formulate a recursive structure within such an exchange economy. Recursive
representations are very important in the analysis of dynamic systems in macroeco-
nomics (see [4]) and therefore it will be of particular interest to learn how to devise
a recursive representation of our dynamic conic equilibrium concept. This will be
achieved by finding an appropriate formulation of a state vector in terms of which
to cast the conic equilibrium.
2.1 Physical setting
Let us start by assuming that in each period t ≥ 0, there is a realization of
a stochastic event st ∈ S. Let st = [s0, s1, . . . , st] denote the history of events up
and until time t. The unconditional probability of observing a particular sequence
of events st is given by a probability measure πt(s
t). For τ > t, the probability of
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observing sτ conditional on the realization of st will be denoted by πtτ (s
τ ). There
are I agents in the economy labeled i = 1, . . . , I with stochastic endowments yi =
{yit(st)}
∞
t=0 of one good. The history s
t is publicly observable. Household i orders















Notice that we are imposing identical preference orderings across all individuals i
that can be represented in terms of discounted expected utility with common dis-
count factor β, common utility function u(·), and common probability distributions
πt(s
t). Here u(c) is an increasing, twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave
function of consumption c ≥ 0 of one good. The utility function satisfies the usual
Inada condition limc→0 u
′(c) = +∞. One role for this condition is to make sure
that the consumption of each agent is strictly positive in every date-history pair.
Another related role of the Inada condition is to deliver a state-by-state borrowing
limit to impose in economies with sequential trading. Before trading, the situation
of household i at time t depends on the history st. A natural measure of household
i’s “luck” in life is {yi0(s0), yi1(s1), . . . , yit(st)}, which evidently in general depends
on the history st. A remarkable and empirically questionable result in the classi-
cal complete markets models is that the consumption allocation at time t depends
only on the aggregate endowment realization at time t and some time-invariant pa-
rameters that describe the time 0 initial distribution of wealth (see [4], chapter 8).
The conic market structure of this chapter will break this result and will introduce
history dependence into equilibrium allocations.
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2.2 Time 0 trading
Furthermore, let us assume that trading occurs at time 0 and after observing
s0. In fact, for the initially given value of s0 = s




Similarly, we set πt(s
t) = π0t (s
t). Let us use q0 = {q0t (st)}
∞
t=0 to denote the state
prices as of time t = 0 and after observing s0. The superscript 0 in state price
q0t (s
t) refers to the date at which trades occur, while the subscript t refers to the
date that deliveries are to be made. Similar to chapter 1, the financial market at
time 0 and after observing state s0 is characterized by two sets M0 and N 0 of
probability measures or “generalized scenarios”. The more scenarios considered,
the more conservative is the financial market. We denote a typical scenario by
π̂0 = {π̂0t (st)}
∞
t=0. We assume π
0 = {π0t (st)}
∞
t=0 ∈ M0 ⊂ N 0 which indicates that
the physical measure π = π0 is one of the scenarios considered by the financial
market and that the financial market is more strict towards aggregate risk. In the
following, we will present the formal definition of the dynamic conic equilibrium
concept.
Definition 2.1 (dynamic conic equilibrium – time 0 trading). Given a financial
economy (
S, π0, U(·), {yi}Ii=1,M0,N 0
)
,
a collection formed by
• state prices q0 = {q0t (st)}
∞
t=0 and,
• for every consumer i, trading zi∗ = {zi∗t(st)}
∞







constitutes a dynamic conic equilibrium with time 0 trading if:
• given state prices q0 and the financial market configuration M0 at the indi-
vidual level, for every consumer i = 1, . . . , I, the trading zi∗ and consumption



























t) ≤ 0, ∀π̂0 ∈M0, (2.1)
• and, given the financial market configuration N 0 at the aggregate level, the
state prices q0 = {q0t (st)}
∞



















It is worth emphasizing that ifM0 = {π0} is a singleton, then household i’s budget













t) = 1, for some t}, the market clearing condition
(2.2) yields the classical one, i.e.,
Zt(s
t) ≤ 0, ∀t, st.
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In contrast to the classical economy, the market clearing condition (2.2) allows the
aggregate economy to transfer wealth through time and histories. Similar to chapter
1, we can define the notions of ask and bid prices.
Definition 2.2 (bid and ask prices). Given state prices q0 = {q0t (st)}
∞
t=0, the ask





































One can simply observe that ask (z;M0, q0) = − bid (−z;M0, q0). Moreover, it is

















and we recover the classical law of one price.
Equilibrium prices and quantities



























which indicates that the supremum is attainable, household i’s budget constraint













Attach a Lagrange multiplier µi to this constraint and use the Envelope theorem [27],





































Note that if M0 = {π0} is a singleton, then
π̂0t (s
t; zi) = π̂0t (s
t; zj) = π0t (s
t),
and the ratios of marginal utilities between pairs of agents will be constant across










However, in general, this no longer holds (see equation (2.4)) in a conic economy
with an arbitrary financial market configuration M0. Similarly, assuming that for










































Using the first order condition (2.3) for any household i, we obtain the following




















To compute an equilibrium, we propose to modify1 the Negishi algorithm (see
[4], chapter 8). The following accomplishes this modification.
1. Fix µ1 = 1, throughout the algorithm, and guess some positive initial values
for the remaining µi, i = 2, . . . , I.
2. Make initial guesses for π̂0(zi), i = 1, . . . , I, and π̂0(Z). A good initial guess
is usually given by the actual physical measure π0.


















































1The non-linearities involved in the definition of a conic general equilibrium makes a convergence
proof of the proposed algorithm non-trivial. A convergence proof would require imposing further
restrictions on the sets M0 and N 0 identifying the financial market configurations. This will be
subject of future research.
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Moreover, corresponding to the market clearing condition, check the validity

























Update π̂0(zi), for i = 1, . . . , I, and π̂0(Z) accordingly. It is worth noting that
this step boils down to maximizing linear objective functions.
6. Iterate on steps 3-5 until the requirements of step 5 are satisfied.












Increase µi for those i’s that violate this constraint and decrease it for others.
8. Iterate to convergence on steps 2-7.
CRRA utility





, γ > 0.
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and states that time t elements of consumption allocations for two distinct agents














t) = 1, for some t}, it says that individual
consumption is perfectly correlated with the aggregate endowment or aggregate con-
sumption. This implies that conditional on the history st, time t consumption cit(s
t)
is independent of the household’s individual endowment at t, st, yit(s
t). Mace [32],
Cochrane [6], and Townsend [33] have tested and rejected versions of this condi-
tional independence hypothesis. As is evident from equation (2.5), our dynamic
conic equilibrium concept is capable of explaining2 these rejections. In fact, for ar-
bitrary financial market configurationsM0, the consumption allocations ratio (2.5)
for two distinct agents depends on time t, history st, and consumption allocations
are not necessarily constant fractions of one another.
2As a matter of fact, we have not shown that our framework “explains” the empirical results seen
in rejecting this conditional independence hypothesis, only that our conic framework is compatible
with it not holding.
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2.3 Sequential trading
Building upon the insight of Arrow [34] that one-period securities are enough to
implement complete markets, this section introduces an alternative financial market
structure, i.e., sequential trading. In order to construct such a sequential trading
arrangement, we need to identify a variable to serve as the state in a value function
for the household at date t. We begin by asking the following question. In the
dynamic conic equilibrium with time 0 trading, what is the implied continuation
wealth of household i at time t after history st, but before adding in its time t, history
st endowment yit(s
t)? This question can be answered by defining the household’s
continuation wealth or financial wealth, expressed in terms of the date t, history st
consumption good, to be denoted by ait(s



































Here,Mt denotes the set of generalized scenarios considered by the financial market
as of time t and after observing history st. The above definition (2.6) for financial











τ ) ≤ ait(st), ∀π̂t ∈Mt.
This means that household i’s future capabilities {ziτ (sτ )}
∞
τ=t in transferring wealth
across time and histories, as of time t after history st, is limited by its financial
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wealth ait(s
t). At time 0, the household’s budget constraint (2.1) in the dynamic
conic equilibrium with time 0 trading gives ai0(s
0) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I. However,
at time t > 0, the financial wealth ait(s
t) typically differs from zero for individual i.
Furthermore, we obtain the following proposition.




















π̂tt+1(st+1) : st+1 ∈ S
}
∈Mtt+1.
Here,Mtt+1 represents the one-period-ahead financial market at time t and in history
st.





































τ ) = πtt+1(st+1)π
t+1
τ (s
τ ), π̂tτ (s


































≤ ait+1(st+1, st), ∀π̂t+1 ∈Mt+1.
We want to show that ait(s


































In proposition 2.1, we have established that ait(s
t) ≤ ãit(st). We can obtain the
actual equality ait(s
t) = ãit(s








indicating that the supremum is attainable. Let us perform a proof by contradiction






































for some π̂t ∈Mt given explicitly by π̂tτ (sτ ) = π̂tt+1(st+1)π̂t+1τ (sτ ; zi).
In moving from the economy with time 0 trading to one with sequential trad-
ing, we propose to match the time t, history st wealth of the household in the
sequential economy with the equilibrium tail wealth ait(s
t) from the dynamic conic
equilibrium with time 0 trading. However, before we give the definition of conic
equilibrium with sequential trading, we have to say something about debt limits, a
feature that was only implicit in the time 0 budget constraint in the economy with
time 0 trading. Hence, we define the natural debt limit bit(s
t) of consumer i at time



















It is the maximal value that household i can repay starting from that period, as-
suming that his consumption is zero always. To rule out Ponzi schemes, we impose
the state-by-state borrowing constraints
−ait+1(st+1, st) ≤ bit+1(st+1, st), ∀st+1 ∈ S.














We are now well-equipped to define the dynamic conic equilibrium concept with
sequential trading.
Definition 2.3 (dynamic conic equilibrium – sequential trading). Given
• the initial state of the economy s0 ∈ S,
• an initial distribution of wealth {ai0(s0)}
I
i=1,






a collection formed by
• pricing kernels qtt+1 =
{
qtt+1(st+1) : st+1 ∈ S
}
, for all t ≥ 0 and st,
• and, for every consumer i, borrowing limit bi = {bit(st)}
∞










constitutes a dynamic conic equilibrium with sequential trading if:





















, and the financial market primitives, the trading
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t) ≤ yit(st) + ait(st),
∀t, ∀st, ∀π̂tt+1 ∈Mtt+1, (2.7)
−ait+1(st+1, st) ≤ bit+1(st+1, st), ∀t, ∀st, ∀st+1 ∈ S,
• and the pricing kernels qtt+1 =
{
qtt+1(st+1) : st+1 ∈ S
}















∀t, ∀st, ∀π̂tt+1 ∈ N tt+1.
Here, to be consistent with the time 0 trading setup, we set ai0(s0) = 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , I. It should be noted that the budget constraint of household i in the conic
equilibrium with sequential trading is well justified in light of proposition 2.1 and




is a singleton, then household i’s budget constraint (2.7) simplifies to the classical








t) ≤ yit(st) + ait(st).



















t), ∀st+1 ∈ S.
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This, along with ai0(s0) = 0, yields the classical market clearing condition (see [4],
chapter 8); i.e., ∑
i
ait+1(st+1, s
t) ≤ 0, ∀t, ∀st, ∀st+1 ∈ S.
Equilibrium prices and quantities
Regarding consumer i = 1, . . . , I, let us assume that for some generalized
scenario π̂tt+1(a
i


































t) ≤ yit(st) + ait(st).
Let ηit(s
t) and νit+1(st+1, s
t) be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers on the budget
constraint and the borrowing constraint, respectively. Forming the Lagrangian and
















t) + ηit+1(st+1, s
t) = 0,
for all st+1, t, s
t. In the optimal solution to this problem, the natural debt limit
will not be binding, and hence the Lagrange multipliers νit+1(st+1, s
t) all equal zero
for the following reason (see [4], chapter 8): if there were any history st+1 leading
to a binding natural debt limit, the household would from then on have to set
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consumption equal to zero in order to honor its debt. Because the household’s
utility function satisfies the Inada condition limc→0 u
′(c) = +∞, that would mean
that all future marginal utilities would be infinite. Thus, it would be easy to find
alternative affordable allocations that yield higher expected utility by postponing
earlier consumption to periods after such a binding constraint. After setting those
multipliers equal to zero, the first-order conditions imply the following restrictions














for all st+1, t, s
t. Now, for comparison, take household i’s first order condition (2.3)
for the dynamic conic economy with time 0 trading from two successive periods and













This shows that the dynamic conic equilibrium with sequential trading is consistent3
with the financial economy with time 0 trading.
2.4 Recursive formulation
At this level of generality, the one-period-ahead financial market configurations
Mtt+1, N tt+1, the pricing kernels qtt+1, and the wealth distributions ait(st) in the
3Establishing that equilibrium allocations are exactly the same in the economy with time 0
trading and in a sequential-trading arrangement is non-trivial due to the non-linearities involved
in a Conic framework and requires further investigations.
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sequential trading conic economy all depend on the history st, so all are time-
varying functions of all past events {sτ}tτ=0. This makes it difficult to confront our
sequential trading dynamic conic economy with empirical observations. Following
much of the literature in macroeconomics and econometrics, we prefer a model in
which economic outcomes are functions of a limited number of “state variables”
that summarize the effects of past events and current information. This leads us
to make a few specializations of the exogenous processes that facilitates a recursive
formulation of the dynamic conic equilibrium with sequential trading. Let π(s′|s)
be a Markov chain with given initial distribution π0(s) and state space s ∈ S. It
means that Prob(st+1 = s
′|st = s) = π(s′|s) and Prob(s0 = s) = π0(s). The chain
induces a sequence of probability measures πt(s
t) on histories st via the recursions
πt(s
t) = π(st|st−1)π(st−1|st−2) . . . π(s1|s0)π0(s0).
In this chapter, we have assumed that trading occurs after the initially given value
of s0 has been observed, which we capture by setting π0(s0) = 1. Because of the
Markov property, for τ > t, the conditional probability πtτ (s
τ ) depends only on the
state st at time t and does not depend on the history before t,
πtτ (s
τ ) = π(sτ |sτ−1)π(sτ−1|sτ−2) . . . π(st+1|st).
Moreover, we assume that households’ endowments in period t are time invariant
measurable functions of st, y
i
t(s
t) = yi(st) for each i. This along with the Markov
assumption for st imposes further structure on our dynamic conic equilibrium. This
motivates us to seek the following recursive formulation.
Definition 2.4 (recursive conic equilibrium). Given
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• the initial state of the economy s0 ∈ S,
• an initial distribution of wealth {ai0(s0)}
I
i=1,
• and a one-period-ahead conic financial market
{(M(s),N (s)) : s ∈ S} ,
a collection formed by
• a pricing kernel q(·|s) = {q(s′|s) : s′ ∈ S} and,
• for every consumer i, borrowing limit bi(s), value function vi(ai, s), and deci-
sion rules ci(ai, s) and ãi(s′, ai, s),
constitutes a recursive conic equilibrium if:
• for every consumer i = 1, . . . , I, the state-by-state borrowing limit satisfies the
recursion







• for every consumer i = 1, . . . , I, given ai0(s0), the debt limits bi(s), the pricing
kernel q(·|s), and the financial market configuration M(s), the value function
vi(ai, s) and decision rules ci(ai, s) and ãi(s′, ai, s) solve the Bellman equation
















q(s′|s)ãi(s′) ≤ yi(s) + ai, ∀π̂(·|s) ∈M(s), (2.11)
−ãi(s′) ≤ bi(s′, s), ∀s′ ∈ S,
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• For any realizations of {st}∞t=0, the corresponding consumption and asset port-












• and given the financial market configuration N (s), the pricing kernel q(·|s) =
{q(s′|s) : s′ ∈ S} is chosen such that the markets clear. Specifically, for any














ait, ∀π̂(·|st) ∈ N (st).
It is worth noting that if M(s) = {π(·|s)} is a singleton, then household i’s budget




q(s′|s)ãi(s′) ≤ yi(s) + ai.


















ait, ∀st+1 ∈ S.





t, st) ≤ 0, ∀st+1 ∈ S.
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Equilibrium prices and quantities
Regarding consumer i = 1, . . . , I, let us assume that for some generalized



















q(s′|s)ãi(s′) ≤ yi(s) + ai.
Let ηi(ai, s) and νi(s′, ai, s) be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers on the budget
constraint and the borrowing constraint, respectively. Forming the Lagrangian and





− ηi(ai, s) = 0,
βvia
(
ãi(s′, ai, s), s′
)
π(s′|s)− ηi(ai, s) π̂(s
′|s; ãi)
π(s′|s)
q(s′|s) + νi(s′, ai, s) = 0,
for all s′, ai, s. Using the Envelope theorem another time, we obtain
via(a
i, s) = ηi(ai, s).
Moreover, in the optimal solution to this problem, the natural debt limit will not be
binding (see [4], chapter 8), and hence the Lagrange multipliers νi(s′, ai, s) all equal
zero. After setting those multipliers equal to zero, the first-order conditions imply




′ [ci(ãi(s′, ai, s), s′)]
u′ [ci(ai, s)]
π(s′|s), ∀s′, ∀ai, ∀s.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
The dynamic conic framework of this chapter could serve much of macroeco-
nomics as foundation. We briefly mentioned how this modeling framework can be
applied to risk sharing. This approach could also help explain a variety of empirical
observations that seem to be inconsistent with complete markets models. For in-
stance, in chapter 4, we will refer to the equity premium puzzle [8] and will describe
how a conic perspective could potentially explain the puzzle. Furthermore, to take
monetary theory as another example, complete markets models dispose of any need
for money or any other medium of exchange. This is because complete markets
contain an efficient multilateral trading mechanism. Any modern model of money
(see e.g., the cash-in-advance model of Lucas [35], the shopping time model [36], the
Townsend turnpike model [37], or the Kiyotaki-Wright search model [38]) introduces
frictions that impede complete markets. Along exactly the same lines, the conic per-
spective adopted in this work is capable of introducing the required impediments to
complete markets. However, these conjectures require further investigations that are
beyond the scope of this work and could be subject of future research. Moreover,
the issues of dynamic consistency, related to ensuring that trading plans accept-
able at t + 1 are also automatically acceptable at t, are in the background of our
dynamic formulation. This requires valuation functionals, i.e., ask and bid prices,
to be nonlinear expectations related to solutions of backward stochastic differential
equations (BSDE’s). Although we didn’t go into much details, recent years have
seen the development of the theory of nonlinear conditional expectations that keep
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all the properties of conditional expectations excepting the linearity. Peng [39–41],
Bion-Nadal [42–44], Jobert and Rogers [45], Cohen and Elliott [46], and El Karoui,
Peng and Quenez [47], have important contributions in this direction.
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Chapter 3: Conic real business cycle model
In this chapter, we shall focus on the stochastic growth model (see [4], chapter
12). The stochastic growth model was formulated and fully analyzed by Brock and
Mirman [48] and is a workhorse for studying macroeconomic fluctuations. Kydland
and Prescott [49] used the framework to study quantitatively the importance of per-
sistent technology shocks for business cycle fluctuations. Many other authors have
used either a stochastic or nonstochastic version of the growth model to approximate
features of the business cycle. To name a few prominent works in this direction, one
could mention the papers by Lucas [50], Prescott [51], Ingram, Kocherlakota, and
Savin [52], Hall [53], Wen [54], Otrok [55], Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [56],
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno [57], Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell [58],
Jonas Fisher [59], Davig, Leeper, and Walker [60], Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [61],
and Kim and Kim [62]. This chapter is in the spirit of the papers by Lucas and
Prescott [63] and Mehra and Prescott [8], but differs substantially in its financial
market configurations. We introduce, to the stochastic growth model, alternative
ways of representing dynamic conic equilibria. In particular, similar to chapter 2, we
consider two types of conic financial markets entailing different assets and timings
of trades: a time 0 trading arrangement, and a sequential-trading structure. We
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are interested in formulating recursive representations, however, because there are
endogenous state variables in the growth model, we shall have to extend the method
used in chapter 2.
3.1 Physical setting
Let us first spell out the basic ingredients of the stochastic growth model (see
[4], chapter 12): preferences, endowment, technology, and information. In each pe-
riod t ≥ 0, there is a realization of a stochastic event st ∈ S. Let st = [s0, s1, . . . , st]
denote the history of events up and until time t. The unconditional probability of
observing a particular sequence of events st is given by a probability measure πt(s
t).
For τ > t, the probability of observing sτ conditional on the realization of st can be
written as πtτ (s
τ ). We use st as a commodity space in which goods are differentiated
by histories. A representative household has preferences over non-negative streams
of consumption c = {ct(st)}∞t=0 and leisure ` = {`t(st)}
∞













where 0 < β < 1 and u is strictly increasing in its two arguments, twice continuously
differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions
lim
c→0
uc(c, `) = lim
`→0
u`(c, `) =∞.
In each period, the representative household is endowed with one unit of time that
can be devoted to leisure `t(s


















t) = (1− δ)kt(st−1) + xt(st), (3.2)
where F is a twice continuously differentiable, constant-returns-to-scale production
function with capital kt(s
t−1) and labor nt(s
t) as inputs. Here, At(s
t) is a stochastic
process of technology shocks. Outputs are the consumption ct(s
t) and investment
xt(s
t) goods. In (3.2), the investment good augments a capital stock that is depre-
ciating at the rate δ. Negative values for xt(s
t) are permitted and mean that the
capital stock can be converted back into the consumption good. We assume that the
production function satisfies the standard assumptions of positive but diminishing
marginal products,
Fj(k, n) > 0, Fjj(k, n) < 0, for j = k, n;
and the usual Inada conditions,
lim
k→0





Fk(k, n) = lim
n→0
Fn(k, n) =∞.
3.2 Time 0 trading
Trades occur among a representative household and two types of representative
firms. Let us first assume that trading occurs at time 0 and after observing s0. In
fact, for the initially given value of s0 = s
0, we have π0(s0) = π
0
0(s
0) = 1. Similarly,
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we set πt(s
t) = π0t (s
t). Let us use q0 = {q0t (st)}
∞
t=0 to denote the state prices as of
time t = 0 and after observing s0. The superscript 0 in the state price q0t (s
t) refers to
the date at which trades occur, while the subscript t refers to the date that deliveries
are to be made. Similar to chapters 1 and 2, the financial market at time 0 and after
observing state s0 is characterized by two sets M0 and N 0 of probability measures
or “generalized scenarios”. The more scenarios considered, the more conservative is
the financial market. We denote a typical scenario by π̂0 = {π̂0t (st)}
∞
t=0. We assume
π0 = {π0t (st)}
∞
t=0 ∈ M0 ⊂ N 0 which indicates that the physical measure π = π0
is one of the scenarios considered by the financial market and that the financial
market is more strict towards aggregate risk. Before we describe the problems of
the representative household and the two types of firms in the production economy
with time 0 trading, it must be emphasized that in the economy we include spot
markets for both labor and capital services that reopen in each period. Hence, it is
important to distinguish between the spot markets and the financial market.
Household
In the spot market for labor, the household sells labor services to the type I
firm that operates the production technology (3.1). Let wt(s
t) denote the spot price
of labor at time t and in history st. Moreover, the household owns the initial capital
stock k0 and, in the spot market for capital at date 0, sells it to the type II firm
that operates the capital storage technology (3.2). Let pk0 be the unit price of the
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t) ≤ pk0k0, ∀π̂0 ∈M0. (3.3)
Notice how the household’s budget constraints emphasize the distinction between

























in other words the supremum is attainable, the household’s budget constraint (3.3)











































where η > 0 is a multiplier on the budget constraint. It is natural to set π̂00(s
0) =
q00(s
0) = 1 and obtain η = uc [c0(s0), 1− n0(s0)].
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Type I firm
At each date t ≥ 0 after history st, the type I firm is a production firm that
operates the production technology (3.1) and solves a static optimization problem.




t))− rt(st)kIt (st)− wt(st)nt(st).
In fact, in the spot markets at time t and in history st, the type I firm rents capital
kIt (s
t) from the type II firm and labor nt(s
t) from the household at rental prices
rt(s
t) and wt(s



















If these conditions are satisfied, the firm makes zero profits and its size is indetermi-
nate. The firm of type I is willing to produce any quantities of ct(s
t) and xt(s
t) that
the market demands, provided that these zero profit conditions are satisfied. Ac-
cording to these equilibrium conditions, each input in the production technology is
paid its marginal product, and hence profit maximization of the type I firm ensures
an efficient allocation of labor services and capital. Moreover, since the production
function has constant returns to scale, we can define
F (k, n) =: f(k)n,
where k := k/n. Another property of a linearly homogeneous function F (k, n) is
that its first derivatives are homogeneous of degree 0, and thus the first derivatives
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= f(k)− f ′(k)k.













































































The representative firm of type II operates technology (3.2) to transform out-
put into capital. The type II firm purchases capital at time 0 from the household
sector and thereafter invests in new capital, earning revenues by renting capital to


















t) ≤ rt(st)kIIt (st−1),
kIIt+1(s
t) = (1− δ)kIIt (st−1) + xt(st).
As in chapter 1, we take the natural point of view that the firm is an asset y =
{yt(st)}∞t=0 whose shares are tradeable in the financial market at time t = 0. In fact,






Note that the firm’s capital stock kII0 in period 0 is bought without any uncertainty
about the rental price in that period. However, the investment in capital kIIt+1(s
t)
for a future period t+ 1 is conditioned on the realized history st. Thus, the type II
firm manages the risk associated with technology constraint (3.2). In particular, the
capital storage technology (3.2) states that capital must be assembled one period
prior to becoming an input for production. In contrast, the type I firm of the pre-
vious subsection can choose how much capital kIt (s
t) to rent in period t conditioned
on history st. Note that the firm’s profit in general is a non-linear and concave



























































t+1) + (1− δ)
) ]
.
Here, we are making the natural assumptions that π̂00(s
0) = q00(s
0) = 1. Using the
Envelope theorem [27], the first order conditions can be written as
pk0 = r0(s

















t+1) + (1− δ)
)
. (3.9)
These conditions impose no-arbitrage restrictions across prices.
Market clearing
The market clearing conditions are given by kIIt (s
















≤ 0, ∀π̂0 ∈ N 0.















































































t+1) + (1− δ)
)}
≤ kII0 [r0(s0) + (1− δ)] .
Equilibrium prices and quantities






















Moreover, the first order conditions of the household (3.4), type II (3.9), and type








































































































































Furthermore, using the household’s first order condition (3.4) along with the type I





























Recall that η = uc [c0(s0), 1− n0(s0)]. In summary, we propose to use the follow-
ing algorithm1 which generalizes the Negishi algorithm (see [4], chapter 8) to find
equilibrium quantities and prices.
1. Make initial guesses for π̂0(z), π̂0(y), and π̂0(z, y). A good initial guess is
usually given by the actual physical measure π0.
2. Solve equations (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) for candidate consumption c, labor
n, and capital kI = kII .














1The non-linearities involved in the definition of a conic general equilibrium makes a convergence
proof of the proposed algorithm non-trivial. A convergence proof would require imposing further
restrictions on the sets M0 and N 0 identifying the financial market configurations. This will be
subject of future research.
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4. We can find the spot prices rt(s
t) and wt(s
t) for capital and labor, respectively,



















Moreover equation (3.8) gives the unit price of the initial capital stock, i.e.,
pk0 = r0(s0) + (1− δ).
5. The equilibrium demand z, and supply y for assets, along with capital invest-












t) = (1− δ)kIIt (st−1) + xt(st).


















































































It is worth noting that this step boils down to maximizing linear objective
functions.
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7. Iterate on steps 2-6 until the requirements of step 6 are satisfied.
3.3 Sequential trading
This section describes the production economy with an alternative financial
market structure, i.e., sequential trading. As in chapter 2, we begin by asking the
following question. In the conic production economy with time 0 trading, what is the
implied continuation wealth of the household at time t after history st, but before
adding in its time t, history st value of labor wt(s
t)nt(s
t)? Thus, the household’s
continuation wealth or financial wealth expressed in terms of the date t, history st
consumption good is denoted by at(s



































Here, Mt denotes the set of generalized scenarios considered by the financial mar-
ket as of time t and after observing history st. At time 0, the household’s bud-
get constraint (3.3) in the dynamic conic equilibrium with time 0 trading implies
a0(s0) = pk0k0. Similar to chapter 2, in moving from the economy with time 0
trading to one with sequential trading, we propose to match the time t, history st
wealth of the household in the sequential economy with the equilibrium tail wealth
at(s
t) from the dynamic conic equilibrium with time 0 trading. In the following,
we describe the problems of the representative household and the type II firm in
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the production economy with sequential trading. The representative firm of type I
behaves as before.
Household
At each date t ≥ 0 after history st, the representative household buys consump-
tion goods ct(s
t) and sells labor services nt(s
t) in the corresponding spot markets.
Moreover, in the financial market at time t and in history st, the household trades
claims to date t + 1 consumption, whose payment is contingent on the realization




















t) ≤ wt(st)nt(st) + at(st),
∀t, ∀st, ∀π̂tt+1 ∈Mtt+1. (3.14)
Here, at(s
t) denotes the claims to time t consumption that the household brings into
time t in history st. To rule out Ponzi schemes, we must impose borrowing con-
straints on the household’s asset position. We could follow the approach of chapter
2 and compute state-contingent natural debt limits. In particular, the counterpart to
the earlier present value of the household’s endowment stream would be the present
value of the household’s time endowment. Alternatively, we just impose that the
household’s indebtedness in any state next period, −at+1(st+1, st), is bounded by
some arbitrarily large constant. Such an arbitrary debt limit works well for the fol-
lowing reason (see [4], chapter 12). As long as the household is constrained so that
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it cannot run a true Ponzi scheme with an unbounded budget constraint, equilib-
rium forces will ensure that the representative household willingly holds the market
portfolio. In the present setting, we can for example set that arbitrary debt limit
equal to zero (see [4], chapter 12). Therefore, the borrowing constraint at time t in
history st is given by
−at+1(st+1, st) ≤ 0, ∀st+1 ∈ S.
























t) ≤ wt(st)nt(st) + at(st).
Let ηt(s
t) and νt+1(st+1, s
t) be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers on the budget
constraint and the borrowing constraint, respectively. Forming the Lagrangian and




















qtt+1(st+1) + νt+1(st+1, s
t) + ηt+1(st+1, s
t) = 0,
for all st+1, t, s
t. We proceed under the conjecture (see [4], chapter 12) that the
arbitrary debt limit of zero will not be binding, and hence the Lagrange multipliers
νt+1(st+1, s
t) are all equal to zero. After setting those multipliers equal to zero,
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t), 1− nt+1(st+1, st)]
uc [ct(st), 1− nt(st)]
πtt+1(st+1),
for all st+1, t, s
t.
Type II firm
A type II firm transforms output into capital, stores capital, and earns its
revenues by renting capital to the type I firm. Thus, at each date t ≥ 0 after history














t) ≤ rt(st)kIIt (st−1),
kIIt+1(s
t) = (1− δ)kIIt (st−1) + xt(st).




t) : st+1 ∈ S
}
whose shares are tradeable in the financial market at time t after history st. Alter-


















To be consistent with the conic equilibrium with time 0 trading we assume that
[r0(s0) + (1 − δ)]k0 = a0(s0) = pk0k0. Because of the technological assumption
that capital can be reconverted to the consumption good, we can without loss of
generality consider a two-period optimization problem where the type II firm decides
how much capital kIIt+1(s
t) to store at the end of period t after history st in order
to earn a stochastic rental revenue rt+1(st+1, s
t)kIIt+1(s
t) and liquidation value (1 −
δ)kIIt+1(s
t) in the following period. Therefore, at each date t ≥ 0 after history st, the














t) + (1− δ)
]}
.










t) + (1− δ)
]
.
The size of the type II firm is indeterminate. Assuming that the infimum is attained













The market clearing conditions are given by kIIt (s









t)− [rt+1(st+1, st) + (1− δ)]kIIt+1(st)
}
≤ at(st)− [rt(st) + (1− δ)]kIIt (st−1), ∀t, ∀st, ∀π̂tt+1 ∈ N tt+1.
Note that a0(s0) = [r0(s0) + (1− δ)]k0 = pk0k0.
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Equilibrium prices and quantities
Combining the first order conditions of the household (3.15) and the type I



















Moreover, the first order conditions of the household (3.15), type II (3.16), and type























Comparing this with equation (3.12) shows that the dynamic conic equilibrium with
sequential trading is consistent with the financial economy with time 0 trading.
3.4 Recursive formulation
Our findings so far hold for an arbitrary technology process At(s
t), defined
as a measurable function of the history of events st which in turn are governed
by some arbitrary probability measure πt(s
t). At this level of generality, all prices
{qtt+1, wt(st), rt(st)}, the financial market primitives Mtt+1, N tt+1, and the capital
stock kt+1(s
t) in the sequential-trading economy depend on the history st. That is,
these objects are time-varying functions of all past events {sτ}tτ=0. This leads us
to make a few specializations of the exogenous processes that facilitates a recursive
formulation of the production economy with sequential trading. Similar to chapter 2,
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we let π(s′|s) be a Markov chain with given initial distribution π0(s) and state space
s ∈ S. It means that Prob(st+1 = s′|st = s) = π(s′|s) and Prob(s0 = s) = π0(s).
The chain induces a sequence of probability measures πt(s
t) on histories st via the
recursions
πt(s
t) = π(st|st−1)π(st−1|st−2) . . . π(s1|s0)π0(s0).
In this chapter, we have assumed that trading occurs after the initially given value
of s0 has been observed, which we capture by setting π0(s0) = 1. Because of the
Markov property, for τ > t, the conditional probability πtτ (s
τ ) depends only on the
state st at time t and does not depend on the history before t,
πtτ (s
τ ) = π(sτ |sτ−1)π(sτ−1|sτ−2) . . . π(st+1|st).
Next, we assume that the aggregate technology level At(s
t) in period t is a time-
invariant measurable function of its level in the last period and the current stochastic
event st, i.e., At(s
t) = A (At−1(s




t−1) = s0s1 . . . stA−1,
given the initial value A−1. This specialization of the technology process enables
us to explore recursive formulations of the sequential-trading equilibrium. Let k
denote the beginning-of-period capital and employ the state vector ξ := [k A s] to
completely summarize the economy’s current position. We specify price functions
r(ξ), w(ξ), q(ξ′|ξ) that represent, respectively, the rental price of capital, the wage
rate for labor, and the price of a claim to one unit of consumption next period when
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next period’s state is ξ′ and this period’s state is ξ. The prices are all measured
in units of this period’s consumption good. We also take as given an arbitrary
candidate for the law of motion for k; i.e.,
k′ = κ(ξ).
This equation along with A′ = As and a given transition density π(s′|s) induces a
transition density ρ(ξ′|ξ) for the state ξ. For now κ is arbitrary. As in chapter 2, the
one-period-ahead financial market in state s ∈ S is characterized by two sets M(s)
and N (s) of generalized scenarios π̂(s′|s). Similar to the transition density ρ(ξ′|ξ),
we obtain the induced generalized scenarios ρ̂(ξ′|ξ) and the induced financial market
configurations M(ξ) and N (ξ).
Household problem
The Bellman equation of the household is
v(a, ξ) = max
c,n,a′(·)
{












q(ξ′|ξ)a′(ξ′) ≤ w(ξ)n+ a.
Here, M(ξ) denotes the set of induced generalized scenarios at the individual level
considered by the financial market in state ξ. Moreover, it should be noted that
c = c(a, ξ), n = n(a, ξ), and a′(ξ′) = a′(ξ′, a, ξ).














and by evoking the Envelope theorem twice, we can represent the first-order condi-
tions for the household’s problem as
u` [c(a, ξ), 1− n(a, ξ)] = uc [c(a, ξ), 1− n(a, ξ)]w(ξ),
ρ̂(·|ξ; a′)
ρ(ξ′|ξ)
q(ξ′|ξ) = βuc [c(a
′(ξ′, a, ξ), ξ′), 1− n(a′(ξ′, a, ξ), ξ′)]
uc [c(a, ξ), 1− n(a, ξ)]
ρ(ξ′|ξ).
Type I firm








c+ x ≤ AsF (k, n).
The zero-profit conditions are
r(ξ) = AsFk(k, n),
w(ξ) = AsFn(k, n).
Type II firm
At each state ξ, the type II firm maximizes







subject to x + y ≤ r(ξ)k and k′ = (1− δ)k + x. We take the natural point of view
that the firm is an asset
b(·, ξ) = {b(ξ′, ξ) : ξ′ ∈ X}
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whose shares are tradeable in the financial market in state ξ. Alternatively, the











q(ξ′|ξ) [r(ξ′, ξ) + (1− δ)]
}
.







q(ξ′|ξ) [r(ξ′, ξ) + (1− δ)] .
Market clearing







q(ξ′|ξ) [a′(ξ′, a, ξ)− [r(ξ′) + (1− δ)] k′] ≤ a− [r(ξ) + (1− δ)] k.
Recursive equilibrium
We can summarize the preceding discussion in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (recursive conic equilibrium – production economy). Given
• an initial state vector ξ0 = [k0 A0 s0], where k0 is an initial capital stock, A0
is an initial aggregate technology level, and s0 ∈ S,
• an initial wealth level a0(s0), a one-period-ahead conic financial market
{(M(s),N (s)) : s ∈ S} ,
• a transition density π(s′|s), and a law of motion A′ = As for the aggregate
technology level,
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a collection formed by
• a pricing kernel q(·|ξ) = {q(ξ′|ξ) : s′ ∈ S}, where ξ = [k A s] is the state
vector,
• spot prices r(ξ) and w(ξ),
• a perceived law of motion k′ = κ(ξ) along with the associated induced transition
density ρ(ξ′|ξ) and the corresponding induced one-period-ahead conic financial
market
{(M(ξ),N (ξ)) : ξ ∈ X} ,
• and a household value function v(a, ξ) along with decision rules c(a, ξ), n(a, ξ),
and a′(ξ′, a, ξ),
constitutes a recursive conic equilibrium if
• given initial wealth a0(s0), wage w(ξ), pricing kernel q(·|ξ), and the financial
market configuration M(ξ), the value function v(a, ξ) along with the decision
rules c(a, ξ), n(a, ξ), and a′(ξ′, a, ξ) solve the Bellman equation
v(a, ξ) = max
c,n,{a′(ξ′): ξ′∈X}
u(c, 1− n) + β
∑
ξ′∈X







q(ξ′|ξ)a′(ξ′) ≤ w(ξ)n+ a, ∀ρ̂(·|ξ) ∈M(ξ), (3.17)
−a′(ξ′) ≤ 0, ∀ξ′ ∈ X,









c+ x ≤ AsF (k, n),
• at each state ξ ∈ X, given a stochastic rental price r(·, ξ), pricing kernel q(·|ξ),











q(ξ′|ξ) [r(ξ′, ξ) + (1− δ)]
}
,
• and the pricing kernel q(·|ξ) = {q(ξ′|ξ) : s′ ∈ S}, spot prices r(ξ) and w(ξ),








a′(ξ′, a, ξ)− [r(ξ′, ξ) + (1− δ)]k′
}
≤ a− [r(ξ) + (1− δ)] k,
∀ρ̂(·|ξ) ∈ N (ξ).
3.5 Concluding remarks
To motivate interest in the role of financial factors in business fluctuations it
is no longer necessary to appeal either to the Great Depression or to the experiences
of many emerging market economies. Indeed, the financial crisis of 2007–09 put
a spotlight (see e.g., [5, 64, 65]) on the need for a unified framework that can help
us organize our thinking about financial markets and aggregate economic activity.
The recursive conic equilibrium concept of this chapter provides us with such a
framework, and can help us address questions of the form: How disruptions in
financial markets can induce a crisis that affects real activity? How various financial
market interventions might work to mitigate the crisis?
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Chapter 4: Primer on conic asset pricing
An equilibrium price system for an economy with conic financial markets (see
chapter 2) can be used to price any redundant assets. An asset is redundant if it
offers a bundle of history-contingent dated claims whose payoff could be synthesized
as a measurable function of the economy’s state.
4.1 Pricing redundant assets
Let {dt(st)}∞t=0 be a stream of claims on time t, history st consumption, where
dt(s
t) is a measurable function of st. The ask and bid prices of an asset entitling







































As an example, consider the price of a riskless consol, that is, an asset offering
to pay one unit of consumption for sure each period. Then dt(s
t) = 1 for all t and
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As another example, consider a sequence of strips of payoffs on the riskless
consol. The time t strip is just the payoff process dτ = 1 if τ = t ≥ 0, and 0
otherwise. Thus, the owner of the strip is entitled to the time t coupon only. The






















respectively. We can think of the t-period riskless strip as a t-period zero-coupon
bond.
Arrow-Debreu security
Consider an Arrow-Debreu security entitling the owner to one unit of con-
sumption at t and in history st. The ask and bid values of the time t, history st
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t) be the time 0 ask price of an asset that entitles the owner to















When the units of the price are time 0, state s0 goods, the normalization is π̂00(s
0) =
q00(s
0) = 1. To convert the price into units of time t, history st consumption goods,


























is the price of one unit of consumption delivered at time τ , history sτ in terms of







and let Mt denote the set of generalized scenarios π̂t = {π̂tτ (sτ )}
∞
τ=t considered by
the financial market at time t, history st. Thus, the ask price at time t, history st
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If we want to find the ask price at time t in history st of a claim to a random payoff























where Et is the conditional expectation operator. We removed the superscript i,
since the above equality holds for every household i. Define Raskt,t+1 to be the one-
































































, ∀π̂tt+1 ∈Mtt+1. (4.1)















Note that if Mtt+1 = {πtt+1} is a singleton, then Rbidt,t+1 = Raskt,t+1 = Rtt+1 and we








The above equation (4.3) summarizes in a nutshell most of the classical asset pricing








where γ is a coefficient of relative risk aversion, restriction (4.3) fails to work well
when applied to data on returns of stocks and risk-free bonds. Mehra and Prescott [8]
called this difficulty the equity premium puzzle. A substantial part of the problem
is that with aggregate U.S. data for ct and “reasonable” values for γ, the stochastic
discount factor mtt+1 is simply insufficiently volatile. For insightful reviews and lists
of possible resolutions of the equity premium puzzle, see the papers by Aiyagari [66],
Kocherlakota [67], and Cochrane [68]. In a conic framework, as equation (4.1)
indicates, the additional factor
π̂tt+1
π̂tt+1(z)
can help increase the volatility and consequently explain the equity premium puz-
zle. Moreover, Hansen and Jagannathan [69] showed that a very weak theoretical
restriction on prices, namely a “law of one price”, is enough to imply that there
exists a stochastic discount factor m that satisfies equation (4.3). Therefore, the
law of one price is another major contributor to the equity premium puzzle. Given
that a conic economy is indeed a two price economy (see equation (4.2)), it can help
explain the puzzle from this perspective as well. Indeed, these observations need
more investigations that are beyond the scope of this work.
4.2 j-step pricing kernel
The j-step pricing kernel, denoted by qj(s
′|s), gives the price of one unit of
consumption j periods ahead, contingent on the state in that future period being
s′, given that the current state is s. In particular, q1(s
′|s) corresponds to the one-
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period-ahead pricing kernel q(s′|s) when j = 1. With markets in all possible j-step-
ahead contingent claims, the augmented version of constraint (2.11), the household’s








qj(st+j|st)zit,j(st+j) ≤ yi(st) + ait,
∀π̂j(·|st) ∈Mj(st), ∀j ≥ 1.
Here, Mj(st) denotes the set of generalized scenarios considered by the financial
market in state st for j-step-ahead contingent claims. Moreover, z
i
t,j(st+j) is house-
hold i’s holdings, at the end of period t, of contingent claims that pay one unit of
the consumption good j periods ahead at date t+ j, contingent on the state at date
t + j being st+j. The household’s wealth a
i
t+1(st+1) in the next period depends on









∀π̂j−1(·|st+1) ∈Mj−1(st+1), ∀j ≥ 2.
The realization of st+1 determines which element of the vector of one-period-ahead
claims {zit,1(st+1)} pays off at time t + 1, and also the capital gains and losses
inflicted on the holdings of longer horizon claims implied by equilibrium state prices
qj(st+j+1|st+1) and the financial market configurationMj(st+1). Using the Envelope













This expression, evaluated at the conic equilibrium consumption allocation, charac-
terizes two adjacent pricing kernels. Here, π̂j(·|st, ?) ∈ Mj(st) and π̂j−1(·|st+1, ?) ∈














































for some π̂(·|st; ait+1) ∈M(st) as in equation (2.10). Note that if Mj(s) is a singleton




q(st+1|st) qj−1(st+j|st+1), ∀j ≥ 2.
4.3 Arbitrage-free pricing
By manipulating budget sets with redundant assets, we will describe how
arbitrage free pricing theory deduces restrictions on asset prices. We augment the
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trading opportunities in our conic economy by letting the consumer also trade an ex-
dividend Lucas tree. The Lucas tree refers to a colorful interpretation of a dividend
stream as “fruit” falling from a “tree” in a pure exchange economy studied by
Lucas [70]. Assume that at time t, in addition to purchasing a quantity zt,j(st+j)
of j-step-ahead claims paying one unit of consumption at time t + j if the state
takes value st+j at time t + j, the consumer also purchases Nt > 0 units of a stock
or Lucas tree. Let the ex-dividend ask price of the tree at time t be ask(st). Next
period, the tree pays a dividend d(st+1) depending on the state st+1. Ownership of
the Nt > 0 units of the tree at the beginning of t + 1 entitles the consumer to a
claim on Nt[ask(st+1) + d(st+1)] units of time t + 1 consumption. As before, let at
be the wealth of the consumer, apart from his endowment, y(st). In this setting,








qj(st+j|st)zt,j(st+j) + ask(st)Nt ≤ y(st) + at,
∀π̂j(·|st) ∈Mj(st), ∀j ≥ 1, (4.5)
and









∀π̂j−1(·|st+1) ∈Mj−1(st+1), ∀j ≥ 2.
















































































q(st+1|st)at+1(st+1) ≤ y(st) + at.





q(st+1|st)[ask(st+1) + d(st+1)] ≤ ask(st), ∀π̂(·|st) ∈M(st).
Otherwise, the consumer can attain unbounded consumption and future wealth.







q(st+1|st)[bid(st+1) + d(st+1)], ∀π̂(·|st) ∈M(st).
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However, since π̂j(·|st, ?) and π̂j−1(·|st+1, ?) are functions of the equilibrium outcome
of the economy, the above no-arbitrage argument applied to zt,j(st+j) is not able to
tell us anything more than equation (4.4).
4.4 Equivalent martingale measure
Let us recall that the state st is assumed to evolve according to a Markov chain
with transition probabilities π(st+1|st). Moreover, let an asset pay a stream of divi-
dends d = {d(st)}∞t=0. Similar to proposition 2.1 and the short argument following
it, the cum-dividend time t ask price of this asset can be expressed recursively as










for some π̂(·|st; ait+1) ∈ M(st). To arrive at this expression, we are implicitly em-
ploying equation (2.10). Similarly, we have










Therefore, for all π̂(·|st) ∈M(st),
















This can be written as


























Equivalently, for all π̂(·|st) ∈M(st),












≤ Rt [ask(st)− d(st)] ,
where Ẽt is the mathematical expectation with respect to the distorted transition
density π̃(st+1|st). Since the above inequalities hold for any π̂(·|st) ∈ M(st), we
obtain
Rt [bid(st)− d(st)] ≤ Ẽt [bidt+1] ≤ Ẽt [askt+1] ≤ Rt [ask(st)− d(st)] .
The transformed or “twisted” transition measure π̃(st+1|st) can be used to define
the twisted measure
π̃t(s
t) = π̃(st|st−1) · · · π̃(s1|s0)π̃(s0).
The twisted measure π̃t(s
t) is called an equivalent martingale measure (see [4],
chapter 13). In fact, under the law of one price (i.e., M(st) being a singleton),
the existence of an equivalent martingale measure implies both the existence of a
positive stochastic discount factor [69, 71], and the absence of arbitrage opportuni-
ties [14]. Moreover, consider the particular case of an asset with dividend stream
dT = {d(sT ) : sT ∈ S} and dt = 0 for t 6= T . The cum-dividend bid and ask prices
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of this asset can be expressed as
bidT (sT ) = d(sT ), d(sT ) = askT (sT ),
bid ≤ R−1T−1ẼT−1 [bidT ] ≤ R
−1
T−1ẼT−1 [askT ] ≤ askT−1(sT−1),
...
bidt(st) ≤ R−1t Ẽt
[




R−1t+1 · · ·R−1T−1 askT
]
≤ askt(st),
where Ẽt denotes the conditional expectation under the equivalent martingale mea-




RtRt+1 · · ·Rt+j−1
, askt,t+j :=
askt+j
RtRt+1 · · ·Rt+j−1
,
for j = 1, . . . , T − t. It follows from the above arguments that
bidt(st) =: bidt,t ≤ Ẽtbidt,t+j ≤ Ẽtaskt,t+j ≤ askt,t := askt(st)
In other words, relative to the equivalent martingale measure π̃, the interest-adjusted
bid price is a sub-martingale while the deflated ask price is a super-martingale.
Basically, using the equivalent martingale measure, the best prediction of the future
interest-adjusted bid price is somewhere above its current bid value. Similarly,
the best prediction of the future interest-adjusted ask price is somewhere below its
current ask value. Alternatively, we can write the following equation,
Rt [bidt(st)− d(st)] ≤ Ẽ [bidt+1 |st] ≤ Ẽ [askt+1 |st] ≤ Rt [askt(st)− d(st)] ,
which is another way of stating that, after adjusting for risk-free interest and divi-
dends, the bid and ask prices of the asset are sub- and supper-martingales relative
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to the equivalent martingale measure π̃, respectively. One can proceed even further
and obtain the following pricing formulas;
Rt [bidt(st)− d(st)] = inf
θt+1∈Θ
Ẽ [θt+1 bidt+1 |st] ,
Rt [askt(st)− d(st)] = sup
θt+1∈Θ
Ẽ [θt+1 askt+1 |st] ,
where Θ is some set of measure changes θt+1 (see [72]). Therefore, a conic economy
provides us with the natural means to extend the classical asset pricing theories.
For instance, using a continuous-time specification of π̃, one can obtain conic Black
and Scholes [73] option pricing formulas (see [13]).
4.5 Concluding remarks
In this section, we have briefly described how the conic modeling framework
of chapter 2 can be applied to extend the classical asset pricing theories and option
pricing formulas. In addition, we have concisely alluded to the equity premium
puzzle and have describe how a conic perspective towards the economy could poten-
tially explain the puzzle. Indeed, these observations need more investigations that
are beyond the scope of this work and could be subject of future research.
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